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I introduce sticky wages in the model with credit constrained or “rule
of thumb” consumers advanced by Galì, Valles and Lopez Salido (2005).
I show that wage stickiness i) restores, in contrast with the results in
Bilbiie (2005), the Taylor Principle as a necessary condition for equilib-
rium determinacy; ii) implies that a a rise in consumption in response
to an unexpected rise in government spending is not a robust feature of
the model. In particular, consumption increses just when the elasticity
of marginal disutility of labor supply is low. Results are robust to most
of Taylor-type monetary rules used in the literature, including one which
responds to wage inﬂation.
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Recent evidence on U.S. data, provided amongst others by Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002) and Galì, Valles and Lopez-Salido (2005, GVL henceforth) seems to
suggest that private consumption does not decrease after a government purchase
shock. Nevertheless, most of dynamic macroeconomic models predicts that a
rise in government purchases will have a contractionary eﬀect on consumption.
Although the evidence is controversial, the literature has identiﬁed this sharp
contrast between the implications of the theory on one hand, and empirical re-
sults on the other, as a puzzle. Much eﬀort has been devoted to the construction
of theoretical models which could solve the puzzle.
One candidate solution, which has received considerable interest, is that ad-
vanced by GVL. The interest is partly due to the simplicity of their approach.
They consider a sticky prices New Keynesian economy, where part of the con-
sumers are standard optimizing agents who trade a consumption good on contin-
gent markets and are endowed with a common initial stock of physical capital.
The rest of the population is constituted by non ricardian or “rule of thumb”
households who consume in each period their labor income. GVL show that
this framework allows to obtain a positive response of aggregate consumption
to a government spending shock.
Three ingredients are necessary to generate the crowding-in of aggregate
consumption. The ﬁrst one is a large enough share of non ricardian consumers,
the second is a substantial degree of price stickiness and the third one is that
the increase in public expenditure is partly debt ﬁnanced.
Notice that the crowding-in of consumption is obtained via a strong increase
in the real wage, which has the eﬀect of driving up consumption of non ricardian
households.
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) ﬁnd evidence of rule of thumb behavior. Using
U.S. aggregate post-war data, they estimate that about half of total income
goes to non ricardian consumers. More recently Muscatelli et al (2004), using
U.S. quarterly data over the period 1970-2001, document that about 37% of
consumers are rule of thumb.
The evidence relative to the response of real wages to a ﬁscal shock is as
controversial as that on consumption. While Fisher et al (2004) ﬁnd a negative
eﬀect of ﬁscal shocks on real wages, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Fatas
and Mihov (2002) ﬁnd a positive, but limited, response.
In any case, none of these works allows to rely on a rise in real wage to
explain the crowding-in eﬀect.
Turning to the role of monetary policy within the GVL’s model, the most
signiﬁcant result is provided by Bilbiie (2005). He points out that the presence
of rule of thumb consumers may change the determinacy condition that the
literature has labeled the Taylor Principle. Under a reasonable parametrization
of the share of non ricardian consumers, no capital accumulation and a walrasian
labor market, he shows that a passive rule is necessary for determinacy.
A natural extension of the GVL model calls for the introduction of some
form of frictions in the wage setting process.
1The model economy I describe diﬀe r sf r o mt h a ti nG V Lf o rw h a tc o n c e r n s
the structure of the labor market and the wage setting arrangements. Beside
considering imperfectly competitive markets, we assume that wages are set in a
staggered fashion according to the Calvo mechanism considered in Erceg at al
(2000) or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a).
Key ﬁndings are that nominal wage stickiness i) restores the Taylor Principle
as a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy; ii) alters the impulse
response function of the model economy after a government spending shock.
With respect to i), I show that, when the degree of wage stickiness is set
according to the available estimates, the Taylor Principle returns a necessary
condition for uniqueness.
This stands in sharp contrast with the results in Bilbiie (2005). A passive
rule may lead to uniqueness of the REE just when wages are moderately sticky
(average duration of 2-3 quarters) and the share of non ricardian consumers
is well above the estimates. For these reasons I regard this case as of minor
empirical interest. Since wage stickiness is an uncontroversial empirical fact, the
result should be of importance for the central banker concerned with avoiding
sunspot ﬂuctuations.
With respect to ii), I establish that the crowding-in of consumption is no
longer a robust feature of the model. Wage stickiness dampens real wage ﬂuctu-
ations associated to variation in real activity induced by government spending
shocks. This limits the large rise in consumption of non ricardian consumers
which is, instead, registered in a model with ﬂexible wages. For empirically
plausible values of the parameters, the crowding-in of consumption vanishes.
A government purchase shock generates a positive response of aggregate
consumption when the agents suﬀer a low marginal cost of supplying labor in
terms of utility. In this case, the increase in hours worked associated with
the spending shock is enough to boost consumption of non ricardian agents.
As in GVL if the share of non ricardian consumers is large enough, aggregate
consumption will experience a positive variation.
Results are robust to the diﬀerent kinds of Taylor rules proposed in the
literature, including one which reacts to wage inﬂation.
Other proposals, beside that of GVL, have been advanced to solve the Gov-
ernment spending puzzle. Linneman (2006) suggests that the puzzle can be
amended in a frictionless business cycle model by resorting to non-separable
preferences. The employment-consumption complementarity generated by this
form of preferences favours a positive response of consumption to an innova-
tion in government spending. However, as pointed out by Bilbiie (2006), the
restrictions on preferences imposed by Linnemann (2006) are such that labor
supply schedule is downward sloping. Bilbiie (2006) goes on showing that the
conditions under which non-separability solves the Government spending puzzle
imply that the consumption good is inferior.
Linneman and Schabert (2006) describe a new Keynesian model where gov-
ernment expenditure contributes to aggregate production. In this case inno-
vations in Government spending lead to a rise in private consumption when
the government share in consumption is not too large. Nevertheless, assuming
2that Government purchases enter into the production function is a remarkable
departure from standard business cycle theory.
In a nutshell, the message of the paper is the following. The model with rule
of thumb consumers may not lead to a positive response of aggregate consump-
tion to a government spending shock when wages are sticky. Further, when a
share of agents is constrained to consume out of current income, the design of
monetary policy cannot neglect the details of the wage setting process.
1.1 Firms
In each period t a ﬁnal good Yt is produced by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm,
combining a continuum of intermediate inputs Yt (z), according to the following










with θp > 1 (1)
The producer of the ﬁnal good takes prices as given and chooses the quantities
of intermediate goods by maximizing its proﬁts. This leads to the demand of











Intermediate inputs Yt(z) are produced by a continuum of size one of mo-




where 0 <α<1 is the share of income which goes to capital in the long
run, Kt−1 (z) is the time t capital service hired by ﬁrm z,w h i l eLt (z) is the










with θw > 1.F i r m ’ sz demand for labor type j and





































3Price setting. Ia s s u m eﬁrms set prices according to the mechanism spelled
out in Calvo (1983). Firms in each period have a chance 1 − ξp to reoptimize
their price. A price setter z takes into account that the choice of its time t
nominal price, e Pt,m i g h ta ﬀect not only current but also future proﬁts. The









e Pt − µpPt+sMCt+s
i
=0 (2)
which can be given the usual interpretation.1 Notice that µp =
θp
θp−1 repre-
sents the markup over the price which would prevail in the absence of nominal
rigidities.
1.2 Labor market
The description of the labor market follows Colciago et al (2006). I assume a
continuum of diﬀerentiated labor inputs indexed by j. Wage-setting decisions
are taken by a continuum of unions. More precisely union j monopolistically
supplies labor input j on labor market j. Union j sets the nominal wage, W
j
t ,i n
order to maximize a weighted average of both agents’ utilities, taking as given
ﬁrms’ demand for its labor service. 2 As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a),
agent i supplies all labor inputs. Further, following GVL, we assume that agents
are distributed uniformly across unions.3 Firms allocate labor demand on the
basis of the relative wage, without distinguishing on the basis of household
types. This implies that once the union has ﬁxed the nominal wage, aggregate
demand of labor type j is spreaded uniformly between all households. In other
words, individual levels of employment and labor income are the same across













t,w h e r eLd
t is
aggregate labor demand.4
1νt is the value of an additional dollar for a ricardian household. As it will be clear below,
is the lagrange multiplier on ricardian househols nominal ﬂow budget constraint.
2The union objective function is descrived below as, at this stage, we just provide a de-
scription of the labor market structure.
3This implies that a share λ of the associates of each union is composed by non ricardian
agents.
4Erceg et al (2000), assume, as in most of the literature on sticky wages, that each agent
is the monopolistic supplier of a single labor input. In this case, assuming that agents are
spreaded uniformly across unions allows to rule out diﬀerences in income between households
providing the same labor input (no matter whether they are ricardian or not), but it does
not allow to rule out diﬀerence in labor income between non ricardian agents that provide
diﬀerent labor inputs. This would amount to have an economy populated by an inﬁnity of
diﬀerent individuals, since non ricardian agents cannot share the risk associated to labor in-
come ﬂuctuations. Although this framework would be of interest, it would imply a tractability
problem.
41.3 Households
There is a continuum of households on the interval [0,1].A si nG V L , households
in the interval [0,λ] cannot access ﬁnancial markets and do not have an initial
capital endowment. The behavior of these agents is characterized by a simple
rule of thumb: they consume their available income in each period. The rest of
the households on the interval (λ,1], instead, is composed by standard ricardian
households who have access to the market for physical capital and to a full
set of state contingent securities. I assume that Ricardian households hold
a common initial capital endowment. The period utility function is common
across households and it has the following separable form
Ut = u(Ct (i)) − v(Lt (i))
where Ct(i) is agent i’s consumption and Lt(i) are labor hours. It follows that
the total number of hours allocated to the diﬀerent labor markets must satisfy











t + EtΛt,t+1Xt+1 (3)







we assume that ricardian agents have access to a full set of state contingent
assets. More precisely, in each time period t, consumers can purchase any de-
sired state-contingent nominal payment Xt+1 in period t+1 at the dollar cost
EtΛt,t+1Xt+1. Λt,t+1 denotes a stochastic discount factor between period t +1
and t. WtLd
t denotes labor income and Rk
tKo
t−1 is capital income obtained from
renting the capital stock to ﬁrms at the nominal rental rate Rk
t. PtDo
t are div-
idends due from the ownership of ﬁrms, while Bo
t is the quantity of nominally
riskless bonds purchased in period t at the price (1 + Rt)
−1and paying one unit
of the consumption numeraire in period t+1. PtTo
t represent nominal lump sum
taxes. As in GVL, the household’s stock of physical capital evolves according
to:
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where δ denotes the physical rate of depreciation. Capital adjustment costs are








t−1, which determines the change in
the capital stock induced by investment spending Io
t . The function σ satisﬁes
the following properties:
σ0 (·) > 0, σ
00
(·) ≥ 0, σ0 (δ)=1 , σ (δ)=δ
Thus, adjustment costs are proportional to the rate of investment per unit of
installed capital. Ricardian households face the, usual, problem of maximizing
5the expected discounted sum of istantaneous utility subject to constraints (3)
and (4). νt and Qt denote the Lagrange multipliers on the ﬁrst and on the
second constraint respectively. β = 1
1+ρ is the discount factor, where ρ is the
























































Pt is the real shadow value of installed capital, i.e. Tobin’s Q.
















Non ricardian households. Non ricardian households maximize period util-






As in GVL I let lump sum taxes (transfers) paid (received) by non ricardian
households diﬀer by those paid by ricardian.
1.4 Wage Setting
Nominal wage rigidities are modeled according to the Calvo mechanism used
for price setting. In each period a union faces a constant probability 1 − ξw of
being able to reoptimize the nominal wage. I follow GVL, and assume that the
nominal wage newly reset at t, f Wt, is chosen to maximize a weighted average of



























































where Φt,t+s = vL (Lt+s (i))Ld
t+sW
θw
t and µw = θw
(θw−1) is the, constant,
wage mark-up in the case of wage ﬂexibility. MRSrt
t+s and MRSo
t+s are the
marginal rates of substitution between labor and consumption of non ricardian
















which is identical to the wage setting equation in GVL.
1.5 Government
The Government nominal ﬂow budget constraint is
PtTt +( 1+Rt)
−1 Bt = Bt−1 + PtGt (13)
where PtGt is nominal government expenditure on the ﬁnal good. As in GVL
we assume a ﬁscal rule of the form
tt = φbbt−1 + φggt (14)
where tt = Tt−T
Y , gt = Gt−G





Y . gt is assumed to follow a ﬁrst
order autoregressive process
gt = ρggt−1 + ε
g
t (15)
where 0 ≤ ρg ≤ 1 and ε
g
t is a normally distributed zero-mean random shock to
government spending.5
1.6 Monetary Policy
An interest rate-setting rule is required for the dynamic of the model to be fully
speciﬁed. I focus on the rule analyzed by GVL which features the central bank
setting the nominal interest rate as a function of current inﬂation according to
the following log-linear rule
rt = τππt (16)
5As u ﬃcient condition for non explosive debt dynamics is
(1 + ρ)(1− φb) < 1




I assume this condition is satisﬁed throughout.
7where rt =l o g
(1+Rt)
1+ρ and πt =l o g Pt
Pt−1. In standard sticky price models
with no endogenous investment, as in Woodford (2003) or Galì (2002), rule
(16) ensures local uniqueness of a rational expectation equilibrium (REE) if it
satisﬁes the Taylor Principle, i.e. if τπ > 1 .
1.7 Aggregation
We denote aggregate consumption, lump sum taxes, capital, investment and
bonds with Ct, Tt, Kt, It and Bt respectively. These are deﬁned as
Ct = λCrt
t +( 1− λ)Co
t ; It =( 1− λ)Io
t ;
Kt =( 1− λ)Ko
t ;
Tt = λTrt
t +( 1− λ)To
t ; . Bt =( 1− λ)Bo
t
1.8 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions in the goods market and in the labor market
imply












































As in GVL, we assume that steady state lump sum taxes are such that steady
















µp (ρ + δ)
Since the ratio G
Y = γg is, by assumption, exogenous, we can determine the
steady state share of consumption on output, γc, as follows
γc =1−
δα
µp (ρ + δ)
− γg
which, as noticed by GVL, is independent of λ. In what follows it will prove
useful to know W
P
L















82 The Log-linearized model.
To make our results readily comparable to those in GVL we assume the same
period utility function considered in their work:





which feature a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
and a constant elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor vLL = φ.6 In what
follows lower case letters denote log-deviations from the steady state values. The
log-deviation of the real wage, denoted by wt, constitutes the only exception to
this rule. The conditions which deﬁne the log-linear approximation to equations
of the model are derived in GVL and I report them in the appendix. I provide,
instead, a detailed derivation of the wage inﬂation curve and of the real wage
schedule.
2.1 Wage inﬂa t i o n ,t h er e a lw a g es c h e d u l ea n dt h ee ﬀect
of economic activity on the real wage.
In the case of identical steady state consumption levels, agents have a common
steady state marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. This













t is a weighted average of the log-deviations
between the marginal rates of substitution of the two agents. In what follows
we will refer to mrsA
t as to the average marginal rate of substitution. Given the
selected functional forms, the (log)wage optimally chosen at time t is deﬁned as




t+s {logPt+s +l o gCt + φlogLt}
Combining the latter with the following, standard, log-linear approximation of
the wage index
logWt =( 1− ξw)logf Wt + ξw logWt−1









t =( l o gWt − logPt) − (logµw +l o gCt + φlogLt).
6The selected period utility belong to the King-Plosser-Rebelo class and leads to consant
steady hours.
9is the wage mark-up that union impose over the average marginal rate of sub-
stitution.7 Due to the assumption that unions maximize a weighted average of
agents’ utilities, the wage inﬂation curve has a standard form. Equation (17)
allows to obtain the log-deviation of time t real wage, which plays a prominent
role in the determination of non ricardian agents consumption, as follows




w). Today’s average real wage is a function of its lagged and
expected value, expected and current inﬂation. The term φlt+ct represents the
average real wage that would prevail in the case of wage ﬂexibility. Γ determines
both the degree of forward and backward lookingness.8 Substituting (27) into
(18) we get:
wt = Γwt−1 + Γβ (Etwt+1 + Etπt+1)+Ψyt − Ψαkt−1 + Γκwct − Γπt (19)
where Ψ = Γ κw
(1−α)φ determines the eﬀect on the real wage due to changes in
the level of real activity.
Comparative statics. ∂Γ
∂ξw > 0: a longer average duration of wage contracts
does not have a clear cut eﬀect on real wage inertia. As ξw gets larger both
forward and backward lookingness increase. ∂Ψ
∂φ > 0:t h em o r ee l a s t i ci s
the marginal disutility of labor, i.e. the higher is φ,t h eh i g h e ri st h e
sensitivity of wages to an increase in economic activity. ∂Ψ
∂ξw < 0:t h e
higher is average duration of wage contracts, i.e. the higher is ξw,t h e
lower is the sensitivity of wages to an increase in economic activity.
Intuition goes as follows. A higher ξw implies that the nominal wage will
be newly reset on a limited number of labor markets, thus the previous period
average wage has a stronger inﬂuence on today’s. At the same time those unions
which optimally reset their wage will attach a higher weight on expected future
variables. The parameter Ψ determines the size of the variation in real wage
associated with a given variation in real economic activity. This is jointly
determined by the probability that wages cannot be changed in a given period,
ξw, and the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor, φ.
Woodford and Rotemberg (1997) report evidence suggesting that the output
elasticity of real wage is in a neighborhood of 0.3.
Figure 1 plots Ψ as a function of φ for alternative degrees of wage stickiness
assuming the values β =0 .99 and α = 1
3. Empirical estimates suggest that
wages have an average duration of an year (ξw =0 .75). In this case, a value of
7As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), the coeﬃcient κw is diﬀerent form
that in Erceg et al (2000), which is the standard reference for the analysis of nominal wage
stickiness.The reason is that we have assumed that agents provide all labor inputs. In the
more standard case in which each individual is the monopolistic supplier of a given labor
input, κw would be equal to
(1−βξw)(1−ξw)
ξw(1+φθw) h e n c el o w e rt h a ni nt h ec a s ew ec o n s i d e r .
8The eﬀect of discounting on the forward looking component is quantitatively negligible.
10Ψ consistent with the estimates in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) is obtained
by setting φ close to 5.
In a model with a frictionless labor market this would lead to an intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in labor supply equal to 0.2, which is in line with
the micro-evidence in Card (1991) and Pencavel (1986). Thus, I obtain a output
sensitivity of real wage consistent with the estimates using empirically plausible
values of φ and ξw.









which is the wage setting equation in GVL. In order to be consistent with
the afore-mentioned evidence on the output elasticity of real wage GVL set φ
equal to 0.2. This value is, however, far from consistent with the microeco-
nomic evidence on the elasticity of labor supply and from standard calibration
of preferences.
3C a l i b r a t i o n
We calibrate the parameters of the model since the analysis of equilibrium de-
terminacy and equilibrium dynamics that follow draws on numerical results.
The time unit is meant to be a quarter. In the baseline parametrization we
set ξw =0 .75, which implies an average duration of wage contracts of one year
as suggested by the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Levine et al
(2005). α and β assume the standard values of 1
3 and 0.99 respectively. Table
1 reports the output sensitivity of real wage Ψ as a function of φ.I n c o l u m n
2 I consider the baseline calibration for wage stickiness, while in column 4 I
evaluate Ψ under the limiting case of wage ﬂexibility.
Table 1 shows that, under the baseline calibration for wage stickiness, set-
ting φ =4 .84 allows to match the output elasticity of real wage reported by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), thus I take this value as the baseline. How-
ever, to evaluate the dependence of the model’s implications on the elasticity
of the marginal disutility of labor, we consider two other values of φ beside the
baseline. The ﬁrst, φ =0 .2, corresponds to the value employed by GVL, the
second φ =1is chosen because commonly employed in the literature. The table,
consistently with the discussion in the previous section, points out that when
standard values are assigned to φ,t h eﬂexible wage scenario leads to extremely
high output sensitivity of real wage.
Remaining parameters are displayed in table 2, and the reader can refer to
the references reported in GVL for empirical evidence supporting them. How-
ever, it is worth mentioning that in the baseline calibration τπ is set to 1.5.
Thus monetary policy is assumed to satisfy the standard Taylor Principle.
11Table 1: Output sensitivity of real wage as a function of the elasticity of labor
disutility and the calvo parameter on wages.
ΨΨ
φ=0.2; ξw=0.75 0.011 φ=0.2; ξw=0 0.3
φ=1; ξw=0.75 0.055 φ=1; ξw=0 1.5
φ=4.84; ξw=0.75 0.300 φ=4.84; ξw=0 7.26
Table 2: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 subjective discount factor
λ 0.5 share of non Ricardian consumers
α 1/3 share of capital
δ 0.025 depreciation rate
ξp 0.75 Calvo parameter on prices
ξw 0.75 Calvo parameter on wages
θp 6 implies a steady state price mark-up of 0.2
θw 6 implies a steady state wage mark-up of 0.2
γg 0.2 steady state share of government purchase
τπ 1.5 Monetary policy response to π
φb 0.33 debt feedback coeﬃcient
φg 0.1 public expenditure feedback coeﬃcient
ρg 0.9 autoregressive coeﬃcient for g process
4 Determinacy analysis
In what follows I consider the eﬀect of wage stickiness and the share of non
ricardian consumers on the determinacy properties of the REE. I initially assume
that the interest rate is set according to equation (16) and then generalize results
to other Taylor-type rules commonly employed in the literature.
Figure 2 depicts indeterminacy region in the parameter space (λ,τπ) under
the baseline calibration. Visual inspection of the ﬁgure leads to the following
result.9
Result 1. Wage stickiness and the Taylor principle. Under the baseline
parametrization, the original Taylor Principle, i.e. τπ > 1, is a necessary
condition for equilibrium determinacy.
Figure 2 shows that the Taylor Principle is necessary to rule out indetermi-
nate as well as unstable equilibria. In Figure 3 I address the sensitivity of the
result to the degree of wage stickiness.
Panel a depicts the case of wage ﬂexibility (ξw =0 ) ,i np a n e lb wages have
an average duration of 2 quarters (ξw =0 .5) while in panel c of 10 quarters
9The grid search we use to discern determinate combinations of λ and τπ takes a step
increase of 0.01. We let the parameter λ ranging from 0 to 0.99, while τπ r a n g e sf r o m0t o3 .
12(ξw =0 .9).
Panels a shows that for values of λ ≥ 0.2 ap a s s i v er u l el e a d st oad e t e r m i n a t e
equilibrium. However, when the average duration of wage contracts is of two
quarters (panel b), the threshold value of λ for which a passive rule leads to a
determinate equilibrium increases markedly. Panel c shows that increasing the
degree of wage stickiness to values above the baseline does not alter result 1.
The analysis suggests that the results in Bilbiie (2005) are aﬀected by the
introduction of nominal wage rigidity. With an average duration of wage con-
tracts of 2 quarters, which is well below the estimates we have reported, 75% of
the households should be fully credit constrained for a passive rule to implement
a determinate equilibrium. This is above the values suggested in the literature.
Empirical evidence in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) for the U.S., and Muscatelli
et al (2003) for the Euro area, support the view that a plausible value for the
share of non ricardian consumers is in a neighborhood of 0.5.





each panel corresponds to a diﬀerent degree of wage stickiness.10 Monetary
policy response to current inﬂation is kept at its baseline value of 1.5.11 Visual
inspection of the ﬁgure leads to result 2.
Result 2. Indeterminacy and wage stickiness. Wage stickiness aﬀects the
determinacy properties of the rational expectation equilibrium. In partic-
ular, as ξw increases indeterminate regions fairly rapidly contract, decreas-
ing the likelihood of sunspots ﬂuctuations.
Panel c considers the baseline parametrization for wage stickiness. In this
case, if λ is set to 0.5, as suggested by the estimates of Campbell and Mankiw
(1989), falling into the indeterminacy region would require that prices change
on average every 10 quarters. This contract length is far too long compared
with the estimates provided for example by Taylor (1999), who ﬁnds an average
duration of one year.
We build on the economic mechanism described in Galì et al (2004) to pro-
vide an intuition of this result. Suppose that there is an increase in the level of
economic activity not supported by any shock to fundamental variables. This
determines an increase in hours and inﬂation.12 If monetary policy satisﬁes the
Taylor Principle, the real interest rate goes up and ricardian agents decrease
their consumption. However, in the case of ﬂexible wages, sluggish price adjust-
ment determines a strong real wages increase. The eﬀect on hours and real wage
boosts non ricardian agents consumption. If λ is suﬃciently large aggregate
consumption increases and the sunspot increase in output may be self-fulﬁlled.
10Panel a considers the case of ﬂexible wages, in panel b we set ξw =0 .5 ,p a n e lc considers
the baseline calibration where ξw =0 .75 and ﬁnally Panel d depictes the case in where
ξw =0 .9, which implies an average contract length of 10 quarters.
11As above, λ r a n g e sf r o m0t o0 . 9 9w h i l eξp ranges from 0.01 to 0.99, which generously
cover all possible degrees of price stickiness. The grid search takes a step increase of 0.01.
12Price resetting ﬁrms will set a higher price in the attempt to re-establish the desired
mark-up as discussed in Galì et al (2004).
13Suppose now nominal wages are sticky. As pointed out above, holding ﬁxed
other parameters, as ξw increases the real wage response to a variation in eco-
nomic activity becomes lower. By limiting the real wage increase associated
with the sunspot, wage stickiness dampens the variation of consumption of non
ricardian agents and hence reduce the likelihood of multiple equilibria.
Figure 4 makes clear that the Taylor Principle is not a suﬃcient condition
for equilibrium determinacy, independently of the value of λ. We interpreter
this fact in the light of the results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005). They show,
in a standard New Keynesian model, that the Taylor principle fails to ensure
determinacy when endogenous investment is considered together with extreme
price stickiness.
In a previous paragraph we have pointed out that the elasticity of the mar-
ginal disutility of labor supply, φ,a ﬀects the sensitivity of real wage to changes
in output.
For this reason I show in ﬁgure 5 the eﬀects of φ on the shape of indetermi-
nacy regions depicted in the previous ﬁgure. .
Result 3. Indeterminacy and φ. The elasticity of marginal disutility of la-
bor aﬀects the determinacy properties of the REE. In particular, as φ in-
creases, indeterminate regions widens, increasing the likelihood of sunspot
ﬂuctuations.
The intuition follows from the discussion above. A higher φ implies a
stronger response of real wage to a given variation in economic activity, in-
creasing the likelihood of the self-realization of a sunspot shock, through the
eﬀect on non ricardian agents’ consumption.
4.1 Alternative interest rate rules.
In this section we discuss the implications of non ricardian consumers and wage
stickiness on the shape of indeterminacy regions under simple variant of the
Taylor rules proposed in the literature.
We consider rules which are specialization of the, general, instrumental rule
rt = ρrrt−1 + τπEtπt+i + τyEtyt+i (20)
When i = −1, (20) reduces to a backward looking rule, when i =0it corresponds
to a contemporaneous rule and when i =1it becomes a forward looking rule.
For each of the speciﬁcation mentioned we consider the case of inertia, with
ρr =0 .5. Figure 6 depicts indeterminacy regions for each of the speciﬁcation
we consider. A key result is stated in the following.
Result 4. Interest rate rules and non ricardian consumers. Under the
majority of Taylor-type interest rate setting rules considered in the liter-
ature, the determinacy and indeterminacy regions for the model with non
ricardian consumers featuring price-wage stickiness are similar to those
identiﬁed for a representative agent economy.
14We start by analyzing non-inertial cases. In panel d I extend the baseline
monetary rule analyzed earlier to allow for an output gap response. The deter-
minate region can be labelled as standard in the following sense. Determinacy
always obtains when τπ > 1, i.e. if the Taylor principle is satisﬁed. However,
as in the standard model, values of τπ lower or equal to 1 are admissible as
long as the central bank compensates by responding to the output gap. Panel b
depicts the backward looking speciﬁcation. In spite of rule of thumb consumers
and capital accumulation, determinacy regions are once again similar to those
obtained for a standard model. As in Bullard and Mitra (2002), the panel is
divided into two regions by the horizontal line τy =2 . Each of the resulting
region is further divided into two sub-regions. Below the line τy =2we can
ﬁnd the standard (in the sense provided above) regions of determinacy (right)
and indeterminacy (left). Moving above the afore-mentioned line there is, on
the left, a non standard indeterminacy region. It is non standard not because
it is diﬀerent from that I would obtain setting λ =0 , but because determinacy
obtains if the inﬂation coeﬃcient is below a certain threshold, and because the
trade oﬀ between τπand τy is reversed, i.e. higher value of inﬂation response
should be compensated by lower aggressiveness on output. Finally the north
east area features a set of unstable equilibria.
The forward looking rule is depicted in case f. Determinacy region is severely
restricted with respect to the case of a contemporaneous rule. As pointed out
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005), forward looking rules increase the likelihood of
sunspot ﬂuctuations and should be implemented with care.
Panels on the left hand side of the picture suggest that nominal interest
rate inertia makes indeterminacy less likely, no matter the rule followed by the
central bank. As in the standard model, inertia reduces the threshold value
of τπ required for determinacy. In the cases depicted, where ρr =0 .5,d e t e r -
minacy obtains as long as τπ > 0.5. Notice that Increasing ρr to 1 rules out
indeterminate equilibria.13 Increasing the size of rule of thumb consumers does
not determine variations of indeterminate regions in the contemporaneous and
forward looking case. It aﬀects, instead, the backward looking case. More pre-
cisely indeterminacy regions in the inertial case are similar to those obtained
for the non inertial case.14
5 Dynamic Analysis
Figure 7 depicts the response of key variables to a government spending shock
in the case of the baseline parametrization.
Result 5. Impact response of aggregate consumption. Aggregate con-
13N e e d l e s st os a yt h i si st r u ea sl o n ga se i t h e rτπ or τπ are larger than zero.
14The interested reader can ﬁnd a detailed analysis of alternative intrerest rate rules at the
URL: tttp://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/persone/colciago, where I also consider a rule which
reacts to wage inﬂation. In this case a necessary condition for determinacy is τp + τw > 1,
where τw i st h ew a g ei n ﬂation coeﬃcient response. Surprisingly, this is equivalent to the
condition which holds in a model without non ricardian consumers.
15sumption decreases in the aftermath of a, partially debt ﬁnanced,
government spending shock.
Two forces act in the direction of reducing consumption of ricardian con-
sumers. The ﬁr s to n ei st h en e g a t i v ew e a l t he ﬀect determined by the govern-
ment purchase shock, while the second one is due to the positive response of the
real interest rate to the shock. In fact, although wage stickiness dampens the
variations in real marginal costs, and through this channel those of inﬂation,
the response of monetary policy is such that the real interest goes up. To an-
alyze the overall eﬀect on aggregate consumption, I have to consider the eﬀect
induced on crt by the unexpected rise in Government spending. Sticky wages
prevent the large increase in real wage aﬀecting the GVL’s model. This, jointly
with a less prominent rise in hours worked, implies that consumption of non
ricardian consumers does not grow as much as required to determine a positive
impact response of aggregate consumption.
In what follows I assess the sensitivity of result 5 to alternative parametriza-
tions of the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor and to the share of non
ricardian consumers. In Figure 8 I evaluate the sensitivity to φ.D o t t e d l i n e s
correspond to the value chosen by GVL, dashed lines to the unit elasticity case,
while solid lines to the baseline value.
Result 6. Impact response of aggregate consumption and φ. The eﬀect
of a Government spending shock on private consumption is positive when
the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, φ,i sl o w .
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hφ=0.2. Both, the impulse response of crt and
co are favorable to a positive impact variation of aggregate consumption with
respect to the baseline case.
Beside determining a modest elasticity of real wage with respect to output,
al o wv a l u eo fφ implies that agents requires a limited wage change in the
face of a labor demand variation. However, the increase in hours more than
compensates for the negligible variation in the real wage, and consumption of
non ricardian agents responds more markedly than in other cases. Further, the
slight inﬂationary pressure determines a limited monetary tightening, which
results in a small reduction in ricardian agents consumption.
However, as the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor increases and,
importantly, the sensitivity of the real wage with respect to output approaches
the value supported by the evidence, the dynamic of variables is such that
aggregate consumption diminishes.
Finally, I assess the role played by the share of non ricardian consumers, λ.
A clear result emerges from ﬁgure 9.
Result 7. Aggregate consumption and λ. Aggregate consumption shows
a positive response to a government spending shock for large values of
the share, λ, of non ricardian consumers.
Figure 9 makes clear that aggregate consumption shows a positive, and
mildly persistent, response for values of the share on non ricardian consumers
16which are above the upper interval of empirical estimates. As in GVL the eﬀect
of the spending shock on output is increasing in the share of non ricardian con-
sumers. This implies also that the eﬀect on labor demand and on the real wage
are positive function of λ. The pattern of the real wage is transmitted to price
inﬂation. Since monetary policy obeys to the Taylor Principle, the real rate
grows. For this reason consumption of ricardian consumers is lower the higher
the share of non ricardian consumers. This eﬀect counterbalances the increase
in crt,w h i c h ,i n s t e a d ,i sap o s i t i v ef u n c t i o no fλ.
6R o b u s t n e s s
6.1 The response of aggregate consumption to a spending
shock.
In this section I intend to verify whether the impact response of aggregate
consumption is aﬀected by the monetary rule followed by the central bank.
Figure 10 reports the response of aggregate consumption to a government
spending shock under the various speciﬁcations of the general rule (20) we have
analyzed. The response of the central bank to price inﬂation is kept at its
baseline value, while we report impulse response functions for three diﬀerent
speciﬁcation of τy.Is t a t et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Result 8. Aggregate consumption and monetary rules. Backward look-
ing monetary rules are more likely than contemporaneous and forward
looking rules to deliver a positive impact response of aggregate consump-
tion to a government spending shock. Reacting to deviations of output
from its steady state level reduces, instead, the likelihood of a positive
impact response of consumption.
The reason for which a backward looking rule helps obtaining a positive
impact response is straightforward. If the central bank responds to lagged vari-
ables, monetary conditions are unchanged during the period in which the shock
hits the economy, i.e. there is no positive impact increase in the real rate as
under the contemporaneous and the backward looking rule. This favours a mild
reduction in consumption of ricardian consumers, while that of non ricardian is
positively aﬀected by the increase in hours worked and the real wage. However,
as the eﬀects of the shock are transmitted to inﬂation and output, the varia-
tion in the real rate of interest determines a reduction in level of employment,
which drives crt below the steady state level and at the same time causes a
further reduction in co.T h e s e e ﬀects are mirrored in the dynamic pattern of
aggregate consumption, which exhibits a positive response on impact, but lacks
of persistence. Notice that this stands in sharp contrast with what happens if
the central bank follows, for example, a contemporaneous rule, where aggregate
consumption decreases smoothly after the government spending shock (panel
d). The contemporaneous and the forward looking rule do not, instead, diﬀer
17relevantly for what concerns the likelihood of delivering a positive impact re-
sponse of consumption, no matter whether we consider an inertial component
in interest rate setting.
Reacting to output deviation determines a less marked increase of production
in the aftermath of the shock, containing the variation in hours worked and,
thus, in consumption of non ricardian consumers.15
7C o n c l u s i o n s
I regard a framework where current income aﬀects consumption possibilities as
a promising step towards realism in economic modeling. In this case, however,
it should be taken into account that labor markets and the wage setting process
are subject to some form of imperfections.
In an economy populated by an exogenous share of non ricardian consumers,
wage stickiness aﬀects both the response of aggregate variables to a government
spending shock and the conditions for equilibrium determinacy.
Once wage stickiness is considered, the positive eﬀect of government spend-
ing on aggregate consumption reported by the empirical studies of, inter alia,
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), is not a robust feature of the model with rule of
thumb consumers. In particular, it can be replicated just when the marginal
disutility of labor eﬀort is low. Contrary to Bilbiie (2005), I have shown that,
for a wide set of parameter conﬁgurations, an active monetary policy implies
a determinate equilibrium. Determinacy regions are similar to those delivered
by a standard model, i.e. one where all consumers are ricardian. The latter
result is robust to various speciﬁcation of the Taylor rules which can be found
in the literature. Further, it suggests that the feature of the optimal monetary
policy in a setting with non ricardian consumers could strongly depend on the
assumption relative to the wage setting process.
We conjecture that the optimality of a passive monetary rule, as advocated
by Bilbiie (2005) in a sticky prices-ﬂexible wages economy, could be obscured by
considering a modest degree of wage stickiness. This is, although in a simpler
model, part of my ongoing research.
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Appendix.
Log-linearized equilibrium conditions.
This appendix provides a log-linear approximation to the equlibrium conditions
of the model economy described in the text. For a detailed derivation see also
GVL.
Under the assumed functional forms, the Euler equation for Ricardian house-
holds takes the log-linear form
co
t − Etco
t+1 = −Et (rt − πt+1) (21)
Log-linearization of equations (6) and (8) leads to the dynamic of (real)Tobin’s
Q
qt =( 1− β (1 − δ))Etrk
t+1 + βEtqt+1 − (rt − Etπt+1) (22)
and its relationship with investment:
ηqt = it − kt−1











while the assumption that consumption level are equal at the steady state im-
plies that aggregate consumption is
ct =( 1− λ)co
t + λcr
t (24)
20The stock of capital evolves according to
δit = kt − (1 − δ)kt−1 (25)
Log-linearization of the aggregate resource constraint around the steady state
yields
yt = γcct + gt +( 1− e γc)it (26)
where e γc = γc+γg. As in shown by Woodford (2003) a log-linear approximation
to the aggregate production function is given by
yt =( 1− α)lt + αkt−1 (27)
Assuming that steady state stock of debt is zero and a steady state balanced
government budget, the dynamic of debt around the steady state yields the
following law of motion for the stock of debt
bt =( 1+ρ)(bt−1 + gt − tt) (28)
The New Keynesian Phillips is obtained through log-linearization of condition
(2) and reads as
πt = κpmct + βEtπt+1 (29)
where κp = (1−βξp)(1−ξp)
ξp and mct =( 1− α)wt +αrk
t is the real marginal cost.
Equations (21) through (29),e q u a t i o n(19) together with the policy rules
(14)and (16)determine the equilibrium path of the economy we have outlined.
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of real wage with respect to output as a function of the
elasticity of marginal disutility of labor.




















































Figure 2: Determinacy region when wages have an average duration of 4 quarters
(ξw =0 .75). Instability area in black.




































































Figure 3: Indeterminacy regions under alternative degree of wage stickiness. In-
stability areas in black. Panel a (ξw =0 ) ,p a n e lb (ξw =0 .5) panel c (ξw =0 .9).








































































Determinacy region Determinacy region
Figure 4: Indeterminacy regions under alternative degree of wage stickiness.
Panel a (ξw =0 ) ;p a n e lb (ξw =0 .5);p a n e lc (ξw =0 .75);p a n e ld (ξw =0 .9).






































































φ =0.2 φ =1 φ =4.84
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Determinacy region Determinacy region
Figure 5: See ﬁgure 4. Sensitivity to φ.



























































































Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock. Baseline
parametrization.

























































































φ =4.84 φ =1 φ =0.2
Figure 7: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock. Sensi-
tivity to φ .























































































λ =0.5 λ =0 λ =0.8
Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock. Sensi-
tivity to λ.
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Figure 9: Indeterminacy regions under alternative monetary rules. i = −1:
backward looking rule; i =0contemporaneous rule; i =+ 1forward looking
rule















































































































Figure 10: Response of aggregate consumption under alternative monetary
rules. i = −1: backward looking rule; i =0contemporaneous rule; i =+ 1
forward looking rule
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